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Abstract
When trying to maximize the adoption of a behavior in a population connected by
a social network, it is common to strategize about where in the network to seed the
behavior, often with an element of randomness. Selecting seeds uniformly at random
is a basic but compelling strategy in that it distributes seeds broadly throughout the
network. A more sophisticated stochastic strategy, one-hop targeting, is to select ran-
dom network neighbors of random individuals; this exploits a version of the friendship
paradox, whereby the friend of a random individual is expected to have more friends
than a random individual, with the hope that seeding a behavior at more connected
individuals leads to more adoption. Many seeding strategies have been proposed, but
empirical evaluations have demanded large field experiments designed specifically for
this purpose and have yielded relatively imprecise comparisons of strategies. Here
we show how stochastic seeding strategies can be evaluated more efficiently in such
experiments, how they can be evaluated “off-policy” using existing data arising from
experiments designed for other purposes, and how to design more efficient experiments.
In particular, we consider contrasts between stochastic seeding strategies and analyze
nonparametric estimators adapted from policy evaluation and importance sampling.
We use simulations on real networks to show that the proposed estimators and de-
signs can dramatically increase precision while yielding valid inference. We then apply
our proposed estimators to two field experiments, one that assigned households to an
intensive marketing intervention and one that assigned students to an anti-bullying
intervention.
Keywords: Viral marketing, stochastic interventions, counterfactual policy evaluation, in-
fluence maximization
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1 Introduction
Interventions are often targeted to individuals based on their observed characteristics (Man-
ski 2004). Given the large theoretical and empirical literature showing the prevalence of
peer effects in adoption processes, it is reasonable to assume that targeting strategies that
incorporate network characteristics may be particularly successful. For example, a simple
strategy might be to target an intervention at a small number of “seed individuals” who are
well-connected and centrally located in the social network of the target population. Such
a strategy aims to go beyond direct targeting and identify individuals who are expected to
have an outsized impact on total adoption (Kempe et al. 2003; Hinz et al. 2011; Zubcsek
and Sarvary 2011; Libai et al. 2013).1
In this paper we show how to efficiently evaluate such targeting strategies from field
experiments with sufficiently randomized intervention policies. Crucial to our approach is
the insight that many strategies of interest are stochastic seeding strategies, meaning that
the targeted individuals are not determined deterministically but rather selected from a
probability distribution of eligible seed sets. This insight allows us to construct reweighting
estimators using ideas adapted from the counterfactual policy evaluation and importance
sampling literatures. In our analysis these estimators sometimes provide more than a four-
fold boost in effective sample size over simple difference-in-means estimators. Given these
estimators, we also show how to gain further precision via optimized experimental designs,
and how to conduct off-policy evaluation of field experiments that were not explicitly designed
to evaluate targeting strategies.
Our analysis can be used to compare arbitrary stochastic seeding strategies considered
over the same eligible seed sets, but for concreteness much of our discussion and analysis
focuses on a particular strategy that we call one-hop targeting.2 In one-hop targeting a seed
set of k nodes is assembled by first randomly selecting k nodes and then randomly selecting
one of their network neighbors as a seed. This strategy seeks to take advantage of the
friendship paradox, Feld’s (1991) observation that the average node has fewer connections
than the average neighbor.3 Because friends of randomly-selected individuals are likely
to have more connections than the randomly-selected individuals themselves, this one-hop
strategy ostensibly increases the chances of selecting influential seeds. See Figure 1 for an
illustration of the probabilities of different seed sets on a small network. This strategy,
which is local in the sense that it does not require observation of the entire network, is
further motivated by the fact that observing or measuring the entire social network for a
population can be impractical or so expensive that it would be better to spend that budget
1We generally focus on maximizing total adoption. Naturally, one might intervene to reduce an outcome,
such as with vaccinations (Cohen et al. 2003) or other preventative measures (Paluck et al. 2016). Similar
ideas also apply to allocating a budget for measurement in a network, rather than intervention, as with
selecting nodes to serve as sensors for outbreak detection (Leskovec et al. 2007; Christakis and Fowler 2010).
2Kim et al. (2015) call this “nomination” targeting. However, note that it does not involve individuals
nominating a particular peer to be selected; rather they specify a set of people as friends, kin, etc., and then
one peer is selected at random.
3We note that one-hop targeting is different from edge sampling, the original mechanism identified by
Feld (1991) as driving the friendship paradox. See Lattanzi and Singer (2015) and Kumar et al. (2018) for
further discussion of these differences.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the probability of a seed set being selected under the one-hop seeding
strategy with seed sets of size k = 2. (left) Network for one village in Cai et al. (2015), with
three possible seed sets highlighted: the seed sets with maximum probability under one-hop
targeting (red) and two other example seed sets (blue, green). (right) Probability under the
one-hop strategy (pA) of all seed sets, with the highlighted seed sets (red, blue, and green)
corresponding to those in the network on the left. The dashed line represents the uniform
probability of each seed set under random seeding.
simply treating a few more nodes (cf. Akbarpour et al. 2017).
While one-hop targeting has received substantial attention and advocacy, evidence that it
leads to greater adoption rates remains limited. In a field experiment on a study population
of 5,773 individuals in 32 villages in rural Honduras, Kim et al. (2015) compare one-hop
targeting to random targeting, a baseline strategy where seeds are selected uniformly at ran-
dom without using network information.4 The goal was to measure the effectiveness of these
strategies for two public health interventions: chlorine for water purification and multivita-
mins for micronutrient deficiencies. Selected seed individuals were provided information and
coupons for these interventions, and the overall coupon adoption/redemption rate was used
as the village-level outcome. The authors reported no statistically significant results for the
redemption of chlorine coupons but a 95% confidence interval of a 6.9% to 17.9% increase
in the redemption of multivitamin coupons, suggesting that one-hop targeting significantly
increased the adoption rate for that intervention. This inference relies on strong parametric
and within-village independence assumptions that would seem to be violated by the influ-
ence processes posited to cause the observed differences. Reflecting optimism about these
targeting methods, but also the need for further empirical research, that team is conducting
a larger, follow-up field experiment (Shakya et al. 2017).
The Kim et al. (2015) study demonstrates that even for quite large field experiments
aimed at studying one-hop targeting, statistical power and nonparametric inference remain
4The authors use a third strategy where they target in-degree nodes, which we do not address here.
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a challenge. Though the study contained 5,773 individuals, the nature of the intervention
and village-level outcome means that the true effective sample size may be as small as 32
villages. Since field experiments remain expensive and imprecise, better methods are needed.
To see how our insights into stochastic strategies apply here, consider a seed sed selected by
a uniformly at random strategy. If the observed seed set has positive probability under one-
hop targeting (which it will, assuming all nodes in the seed set have positive in-degree) then
it also provides information about the outcome under the one-hop targeting distribution,
regardless of the fact that it was selected under the uniformly at random strategy. In fact,
because the strategies are stochastic, a seed set selected uniformly at random will sometimes
even have higher degrees than a set selected by one-hop targeting. This plays out in the
Kim et al. (2015) study; of the eight villages that were assigned to one-hop and random
targeting for the two different products, in three villages (37.5%) the random seed set had
a higher mean in-degree than the one-hop seed set (see Appendix C.1). Using these villages
in a simple difference-in-means comparison of the sort used in the analysis by Kim et al.
(2015) then becomes statistically counterproductive. In this work we show how we can
instead use potentially all villages to learn about both targeting strategies, and conduct
valid nonparametric asymptotic inference, as well as Fisherian randomization inference for
small samples.
Our methods are not just restricted to the analysis of experiments that were designed
specifically for the purpose of comparing seeding strategies, such as the Kim et al. (2015)
study. In fact, our estimators can be applied to any experiment that randomizes node treat-
ment in a collection of networks. This opens the possibility of analyzing a much larger
collection of studies, as a substantial number of recent targeting experiments assign inter-
ventions using random targeting without the stated goal of evaluating the efficacy of other
strategies. In this paper we provide new empirical results pertaining to targeting strategies
based on two such studies, reanalyzing the data from the farmer’s insurance experiment in
China conducted by Cai et al. (2015) and the peer conflict study in U.S. schools conducted
by Paluck et al. (2016). We also present ways to optimize the design of experiments for
distinguishing two targeting strategies. The optimization is based on the idea that some
seed sets will be much more informative for comparing strategies than others, and such seed
sets can be identified before having run the experiment.
Finally, as stated before, the framework we provide does not just apply to one-hop and
random targeting but rather can be applied to evaluate the difference between any two
stochastic seeding strategies with the same support. There are many natural stochastic
strategies based on both local or non-local information. One-hop and random targeting
both assume no more than local knowledge of the network; other local-information stochas-
tic strategies include multi-hop targeting, targeting random neighbors of a set with particular
demographic traits, a mixed strategy that targets either a random node or a one-hop neigh-
bor, or perhaps targeting both a random set and one of their random friends. The last
example would be expected to behave favorably in domains governed by complex contagion
(Centola and Macy 2007). In settings where the full network is available, a wide range of
stochastic strategies admit themselves: one could target nodes randomly proportional to
degree (which is roughly achieved by one-hop targeting), randomly proportional to some
more sophisticated centrality measure, or using some randomized algorithm to, e.g., greed-
ily construct independent sets (Luby 1986). Relatively little empirical attention has been
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devoted to some of the strategies mentioned here, but we hope that our proposed methods
help to stimulate further research in this area and lower the barrier to entry for running
more powerful field experiments.
1.1 Related work
The present work is related to both prior work on targeting in social networks and work in
statistical methodology.
The literature on peer effects or “social contagion” is large, including purchasing behavior
for products with direct (e.g., Tucker 2008; Eckles et al. 2016) and indirect (e.g., Nair et al.
2004) network effects, and even those plausibly absent network effects (e.g., Aral et al.
2009). Social network information may be used for targeting in at least two ways. First,
individuals may be indirectly affected by interventions received by others. Second, due
to (dis)assortativity, social networks encode otherwise latent information about individuals
(e.g., McPherson et al. 2001; Hill et al. 2006; Currarini et al. 2010; Altenburger and Ugander
2018), so characteristics of network neighbors can be used for targeting even if there are
no expectations of peer effects. Furthermore, there can be substantial heterogeneity in peer
effects (Bakshy et al. 2012; Aral and Walker 2012, 2014) and, in aggregate, in combination
with network structure, large differences in the total influence of an individual’s adoption
(Bakshy et al. 2011; Iyengar et al. 2011; Yoganarasimhan 2012; Banerjee et al. 2017; Galeotti
et al. 2017).
There is a substantial literature on optimal seeding and approximations thereof given a
known network and a model of how individuals are affected by the intervention and others’
adoptions. In this literature on “influence maximization”, computer scientists have devel-
oped algorithms for the problem of finding a set of k seeds so as to maximize expected
adoption under various models (Domingos and Richardson 2001). This influence maximiza-
tion problem is NP-hard (Kempe et al. 2003), so much of that work (e.g., Chen et al. 2009)
is concerned with efficient algorithms for tractable approximations under various models of
social influence. Empirical evaluation of these proposed methods through field experiments
is needed, as the efficacy of seeding strategies can be quite sensitive to deviations from the
simple theoretical models sometimes used. For example, the costs associated with causing
an individual to adopt can vary (cf. Bakshy et al. 2011) and influence and susceptibility
may be correlated in the network (Aral et al. 2013; Aral and Dhillon 2018); thus, the most
influential individuals may be the most difficult to induce to adopt. Researchers in many
disciplines have conducted empirical studies of seeding strategies making use of network in-
formation (e.g., Hinz et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2015; Beaman and Dillon 2018; Beaman et al.
2018; Banerjee et al. 2017). For example, Beaman et al. (2018) select seeds deterministically
for some villages based on an optimization that involves an exhaustive search over all possi-
ble seed sets; this remains tractable because they select only k = 2 seeds per village. Much
of the prior research has examined how one-hop targeting shifts the distribution of degree
and centrality measures of seeds (e.g., Lattanzi and Singer 2015; Kumar et al. 2018), com-
pared with random targeting. Some work has analyzed resulting outcomes under assumed
models of contagion (Kumar and Sudhir 2018; Chami et al. 2017). Ideas based on the friend-
ship paradox (which motivates one-hop targeting) have also been applied beyond seeding to
the related problems of outbreak detection (Christakis and Fowler 2010) and immunization
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(Cohen et al. 2003; Gallos et al. 2007; Chami et al. 2017).
Our proposed estimators are adaptations of estimators familiar from the literatures on
importance sampling, counterfactual policy evaluation in bandit and reinforcement learning
(e.g., Dudík et al. 2014; Li et al. 2011; Precup et al. 2000; Li et al. 2014; Swaminathan
and Joachims 2015; Swaminathan et al. 2017), treatment rules (e.g., Hirano and Porter
2009; Manski 2004, 2007), and dynamic treatment regimes (e.g., Robins 1986; Murphy et al.
2001; Murphy 2003; Hernán et al. 2006). Dudík et al. (2014) and Athey and Wager (2017)
include reviews that span these multiple literatures. Much of this related methodological
work focuses on evaluating and learning deterministic policies, though some work considers
extensions where stochastic policies are addressed. For example, Murphy (2003) consider
policies that simply assign treatment with some non-degenerate probability; Muñoz and
van der Laan (2012) consider shifts to the distribution of a continuous or many-valued
treatment, such as the number of hours spent in vigorous exercise or time from onset of
symptoms to treatment. Stochastic policies are sometimes considered not because they are
of interest per se, but because they solve positivity problems that may exist for evaluating
deterministic interventions (Muñoz and van der Laan 2012; Kennedy 2018). In other cases,
these policies may be of interest because policy-makers have limited control over treatment;
this latter case is more similar to the present setting.
1.2 Paper organization
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we begin with
a detailed presentation of the one-hop seeding strategy. We then introduce the problem
of studying stochastic seeding in more detail, including defining estimands that compare
expected outcomes under different seeding strategies. In Section 3, we present estimators
for those estimands, which are adaptations of estimators familiar from importance sampling,
counterfactual policy evaluation, and dynamic treatment regime literatures. In Section 4,
we derive the variance of these estimators, which lets us consider how effective sample size
depends on both the strategies being compared and the experimental design. Section 5
derives optimal designs for the comparison of two stochastic seeding strategies. We then
turn to illustrations of these methods on simulated and real data. Section 6 presents a
number of simulations, including of a simple experiment using the design from Kim et al.
(2015), but also of the benefits of optimal design. We then consider applications to data
from field experiments in Section 7, analyzing both the experiments of Cai et al. (2015) and
Paluck et al. (2016). Section 8 concludes with a discussion of interpretations and possible
explanations of the empirical results in Section 7.
2 Problem Formulation
Suppose we are interested in estimating the difference in adoption between one-hop and
random targeting. We have data from an experiment in which each of n villages (or, e.g.,
schools, firms), labeled i = 1, . . . , n, was randomly assigned to either random targeting or
one-hop targeting. For each village we also have access to a graph Gi = (Vi, Ei) that records
the social connections among the mi = |Vi| residents of village i.
6
We focus on cases where the targeting strategies in the experiment only targeted seed
sets of size k. Let Si = {s ⊆ Vi : |s| = k} denote the collection of all such seed sets, which
comprise the eligible seed sets in village i. Let Si be a random variable that represents the
seed set selected in village i, sampled from Si. Formally, each stochastic targeting strategy
for village i imposes a non-degenerate probability distribution for the random variable Si.
Let pAi denote the seed set probability distribution for one-hop targeting in village i, and let
pBi denote the seed set probability for random targeting in village i. Throughout will use
A to represent one-hop targeting and B to represent random targeting but, more generally,
much of our approach can be used to compare arbitrary stochastic strategies A and B as
well.
We first discuss the random targeting probabilities because they are more straightforward.
In random targeting, all eligible seed sets are equally likely, so pBi is characterized by the
uniform probabilities
PBi (Si = s) =
(
mi
k
)−1
, for all s ∈ Si, i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
where PBi denotes probability with respect to pBi . Notice that this is independent of the
graph structure of Gi (the network structure of village i), depending only on the number of
residents mi.
The one-hop targeting distributions pAi , meanwhile, depend on the structure of Gi. There
are multiple variations on one-hop targeting that we describe here. One form of the one-
hop targeting strategy proceeds in sequential fashion. A “nominator” individual is randomly
selected, and then a seed individual is then selected randomly from among the neighbors of
the nominator. This seed selection process is repeated until the desired seed set size k is
reached, while requiring that no individual is used as a nominator more than once and that
all selected seeds are unique. Because nominators are used only once, the effective graph is
modified every time a node is removed. For an arbitrary network there is no simple analytic
form for pAi under this version of one-hop targeting.5 Alternatively, we consider a simpler
form of the one-hop targeting strategy which assumes independence among draws of the seed
individuals, meaning that the nominators are drawn with replacement. As a result, seeds can
be thought of as drawn independently (using the fixed network Gi) rather than sequentially.
To compute seed set probabilities under this one-hop targeting strategy we first consider
the case in which seeds themselves are also drawn with replacement (meaning seed sets are
in fact multisets, possibly containing multiple copies of a single seed). The probability of
selecting an individual node v is simply
1
mi
∑
u∈Nin(v)
1
doutu
, (2)
where Nin(v) denotes the set of in-neighbors of v, and doutu denotes the out-degree of node u.
5For fixed k the probabilities can be calculated exactly in O(mki ) time or approximated via Monte Carlo
sampling from the targeting procedure, though even this quickly becomes intractable for many realistic
settings.
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Then PA,repli , the probability with respect to pAi with replacement, is then:
PA,repli (Si = s) = k!
∏
v∈s
1
mi
∑
u∈Nin(v)
1
doutu
. (3)
The k! in the above expression comes from the fact that we seek the probabilities for un-
ordered sets. For a given seed set s this probability is straight-forward to compute.
With the above probabilities in hand, we still need to translate each probability with
replacement to one without replacement (where the seeds are unique). We can do this
translation if we know the overall probability of selecting a set of size k that is unique. In
Gi there are
(
mi
k
)
unique seed sets of size k, and when this quantity is manageable we can
simply compute the total probability
pii =
∑
s∈Si:s unique,|s|=k
PA,repli (Si = s), (4)
which lets us use a simple normalization to compute the one-hop targeting probabilities
without replacement:
PAi (Si = s) =
1
pii
PA,repli (Si = s). (5)
As noted above, this computation is only manageable when
(
mi
k
)
, the number of unique
seed sets of size k, is a manageable quantity. One village in the Cai et al. (2015) data we
analyze has 49 nodes and 13 seeds, meaning that there are
(
49
13
) ≈ 262 billion unique seed sets.
In such settings (or in larger networks, such as those in the Kim et al. (2015) experiment),
we can still follow the above approach if we have a suitable estimator of pii, the probability
of selecting a unique seed set. We discuss such a suitable estimator pˆii in Appendix B, which
we employ in our reanalysis of Cai et al. (2015) in Section 7.
For every village the experiment produces a village-level response Yi. We follow the
potential outcomes framework (Neyman 1923; Rubin 1974) and assume that the potential
outcomes are fixed at the seed set level, meaning that Yi = yi(Si), where yi : Si → Y is a
function mapping from the space of seed sets to the outcome space Y . In most of the cases
that we study, Yi is a count or fraction of adopters of the village and so Y = Z or Y = [0, 1],
but this fact is not important for any of our results.
Given the above notation, we can now state the estimand for the experiment in both a
finite population and superpopulation framework. The goal of the experiment is to estimate
the difference in expected outcomes for each of the two targeting strategies:
τfp =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
EAi [yi(Si)]− EBi [yi(Si)]
]
, (6)
where EAi and EBi denote expectation over Si ∼ pAi and Si ∼ pBi , respectively. Here τfp is a
finite population estimand, which considers the villages to be fixed.
We also consider estimation of the superpopulation estimand, in which the villages (and
the corresponding networks Gi) are viewed as an i.i.d. sample from an infinite superpopu-
lation. In this case, we may consider a single design distribution p∆, from which seed sets
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are sampled i.i.d. The goal is to study the difference between the superpopulation one-hop
targeting distribution (denoted pA) and the superpopulation random targeting distribution
(denoted pB). The finite population distributions discussed above, pAi and pBi , result from
conditioning pA and pB on the observed network Gi for each sampled village i.
In the superpopulation framework seed sets are i.i.d. draws of a random variable S. We
observe i.i.d. realizations of a response variable Y = y(S), and the superpopulation estimand
is then
τsp = EA[y(S)]− EB[y(S)], (7)
where EA and EB denote expectation with respect to the superpopulation targeting distri-
butions.
Notice that τsp can be also be written as
τsp = E∆
[
pA(S)− pB(S)
p∆(S)
y(S)
]
.
3 Estimators
We now derive estimators for the above estimands. Let Zi be the village-level treatment
indicator, where Zi = 1 if village i is assigned to one-hop targeting and Zi = 0 if village
i is assigned to random targeting. The observed data consist of the realized treatment
assignments z1, . . . , zn and outcomes y1, . . . , yn. We use lowercase letters to indicate that
these are observed values.
The simplest estimator is the difference-in-means estimator, which is simply the difference
in sample means for villages assigned to each targeting strategy:
τˆDM =
1∑n
i=1 zi
n∑
i=1
ziyi − 1∑n
i=1(1− zi)
n∑
i=1
(1− zi)yi.
The difference-in-means estimator is unbiased for both τfp and τsp, but we can increase preci-
sion (Särndal 1976) by noting that each observation is potentially informative about multiple
targeting strategies: if an observed seed set has positive probability under a particular tar-
geting strategy, then it provides information about that strategy.
We assume that the experiment selects Zi ∼ Bernoulli(ρ), where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the treat-
ment assignment probability. Each seed set Si is then sampled from the mixture distribution
Si ∼ ρpAi + (1− ρ)pBi .
We refer to this distribution as the design distribution for village i, denoted by p∆i , with
probabilities given by
P∆i (Si = s) = ρP
A
i (Si = s) + (1− ρ)PBi (Si = s). (8)
Since pAi , pBi , and p∆i are all completely known, we in particular know the exact proba-
bilities corresponding to the observed seed sets. Let si be the observed seed set for village i
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and let
ai = P
A
i (Si = si),
bi = P
B
i (Si = si),
di = P
∆
i (Si = si),
denote the corresponding observed probabilities. (We use lowercase, Latin letters to em-
phasize that ai, bi, and di are known and observed.) We can then compute reweighting
estimators by defining the weights
wAi = ai/di, w
B
i = bi/di. (9)
Then the Horvitz–Thompson estimator (Horvitz and Thompson 1952) is defined by
τˆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(wAi − wBi )yi. (10)
By defining the normalized weights
w˜Ai =
wAi
n−1
∑
j w
A
j
, w˜Bi =
wBi
n−1
∑
j w
B
j
,
we obtain the Hájek estimator
τ˜ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(w˜Ai − w˜Bi )yi. (11)
These estimators are familiar in the importance sampling literature, where the Horvitz–
Thompson estimator is known as an unnormalized importance sampling estimator and the
Hájek estimator is known as an self-normalized importance sampling estimator (see, for
example, Owen (2013)). In that context, data is provided by means of an importance distri-
bution but the desired quantities are population moments of a different reference distribution.
For our application, the design distribution, p∆i , serves as the importance distribution and
the two targeting distributions, pAi and pBi , are the reference distributions.
In the importance sampling literature there are competing arguments for whether to use
the unnormalized estimator τˆ or the normalized estimator τ˜ , and the optimal choice will
depend on the particular application. See, for example, the discussion in Owen (2013, Ch.
9). The Horvitz–Thompson estimator is unbiased, as the unnormalized weights wAi and
wBi have mean one. However, if they have excessive variance then the resulting Horvitz–
Thompson estimator will be quite unstable. The Hájek estimator remedies this problem by
forcing the mean of the weights w˜Ai and w˜Bi to be exactly equal to one. The Hájek estimator
is biased, but this bias is negligible in large sample sizes. In our case, since the seed set
probabilities are usually extremely small, we generally expect the self-normalized estimator
to be more precise.
This approach can also be used for off-policy evaluation. Such off-policy evaluation
requires positivity:
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Assumption 1 (Positivity). For every village i and si ∈ Si, if pAi (si) > 0 or pBi (si) > 0,
then p∆i (si) > 0.
Positivity is satisfied for the mixture distribution considered above and for other cases. For
example, suppose a seeding experiment on a collection of networks was designed for another
purpose and used completely random assignment to treatment. In this case the design
distribution is simply the random targeting distribution, p∆ = pB, rather than the mixture
distribution given by equation (8). Then wBi = bi/bi = 1, so of course the random targeting
mean is estimated using the standard sample mean of the observations. The off-policy
estimate for one-hop targeting is obtained by using the weights wAi = ai/bi.
Remark 1. In some common cases, Assumption 1 may not be strictly satisfied for the
stochastic targeting strategies we have considered so far. For example, an experiment may
have used a design that blocked (i.e., pre-stratified) on observables (e.g., household income),
such that is was impossible for all k seeds to be, e.g., households in the highest income
category. One can then consider variations on the stochastic seeding strategies that condition
on, e.g., the relevant balance between seeds and non-seeds.
Remark 2. Experimental designs may often be mixtures of stochastic and deterministic
strategies (e.g., Kim et al. (2015) use a mixture of random seeding, one-hop seeding, and
selecting the maximum in-degree nodes). The unconditional design distribution p∆i may still
satisfy Assumption 1 even if not all, or even none, of the component distributions do so
individually.
4 Inference
In the previous section we described how counterfactual evaluation of village-level outcomes
is possible for non-deterministic targeting strategies. The nature of our problem makes
standard Neyman-style variance estimates (cf. Aronow and Middleton 2013; Imbens and
Rubin 2015) for the finite population treatment effect τfp problematic. This is because
the observations are drawn from seed sets of arbitrarily different sample spaces Si. As a
result, observations from village i provide no information about village j, even if i and j
were exposed to the same treatment strategy. For example, consider the Horvitz–Thompson
estimator τˆ defined in equation (10). Since villages are independent, τˆ has variance
Var(τˆ) =
1
n2
n∑
i=1
Var[(wAi − wBi )yi].
The village-level variances must be estimated separately, and because we observe only a
single seed set in each village i, estimating any of the terms Var[(wAi −wBi )yi] is impossible.
Therefore, we focus on inference for the superpopulation average treatment effect τsp, so that
information can be combined across different villages.
In the standard importance sampling problem, the goal is to estimate a single population
mean. Our problem differs slightly in that the importance sampled data are repurposed to
estimate a difference of two population means, rather than a single population mean. These
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estimates are correlated, so the standard importance sampling variance expressions and
variance estimates do not directly apply. In what follows we compute novel expressions for
the variances and variance estimates. Proofs of these two propositions appear in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Let S ∼ p∆ be a random seed set and let PA = pA(S), PB = pB(S), and
P∆ = p∆(S) be random variables representing the probabilities corresponding to seed set S.
Let Y = y(S), WA = PA/P∆, and WB = PB/P∆. Then the Horvitz–Thompson estimator τˆ ,
defined in equation (10), has expectation E[τˆ ] = τsp and Var(τˆ) = Vτˆ/n, where
Vτˆ = E
[
1
P 2∆
((PA − PB)Y − τspP∆)2
]
= E[((WA −WB)Y − τsp)2]. (12)
It is easy to construct an unbiased estimate of the variance expression in Proposition 1
by substituting in observed sample quantities, producing the variance estimate
Vˆτˆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
d2i
((ai − bi)yi − τˆ di)2 = 1
n
n∑
i=1
((wAi − wBi )yi − τˆ)2. (13)
The Hájek estimator is not unbiased, but it is correct in large samples in the sense that
it is consistent and asymptotically normal.
Proposition 2. Let S, PA, PB, P∆, and Y be as in Proposition 1. Let µA = EA[Y ] and
µB = EB[Y ]. Then the Hájek estimator τ˜ , defined in (11), satisfies τ˜ → τsp as n→∞ and
√
n(τ˜ − τsp)⇒ N(0, Vτ˜ ),
where
Vτ˜ = E
[
1
P 2∆
(
µAPA − µBPB − Y (PA − PB)
)2]
. (14)
We can estimate the Hájek variance with
Vˆτ˜ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
d2i
(µ˜Aai − µ˜Bbi − yi(ai − bi))2, (15)
where µ˜A = n−1
∑n
i=1 w˜
A
i yi and µ˜B = n−1
∑n
i=1 w˜
B
i yi are the Hájek plug-in estimates of the
population means.
These variance estimators can be used to construct confidence intervals and conduct
hypothesis tests using normal theory.
4.1 Effective sample size diagnostics
A measure of effective sample size, obtained by comparing the variance to standard un-
weighted averages, can be a useful diagnostic for determining whether the importance distri-
bution carries enough information to estimate the mean of the target distribution and may
inform whether or not asymptotic approximations for inference are appropriate (Owen 2013,
Section 9.3). We focus on the self-normalized (Hájek) estimator in this section, as it is the
weighted equivalent of an unweighted sample average.
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4.1.1 Off-policy population mean
Consider the off-policy setting where we have observed outcomes under an importance dis-
tribution pB and wish to estimate the population mean under a target distribution pA. This
is the case, for example, when seed sets are assigned according to random targeting (B) but
we wish to make inferences about one-hop targeting (A). Given weights wAi = ai/bi as in
equation (9), that mean µA is estimated using the weighted average
µˆA =
∑n
i=1w
A
i yi∑n
i=1 w
A
i
Now, let σ2 = Var(yi). Then, conditionally on the observed weights,
Var(µˆA) = σ
2
∑n
i=1(w
A
i )
2
(
∑n
i=1 w
A
i )
2
= σ2
w2A
nw¯2A
,
where
w¯A =
1
n
n∑
i=1
wAi , w
2
A =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(wAi )
2.
In contrast, an unweighted sample average of neff independent observations has variance
σ2/neff, so µˆA has the same variance as an unweighted average of
neff =
(
∑n
i=1w
A
i )
2∑n
i=1(w
A
i )
2
=
nw¯2A
w2A
(16)
observations. If neff is much smaller than n, then it may be the case that pA is too different
from pB to be able to estimate µA using observations from pB. This notion of defining an
effective sample size for weighted averages is quite old and is also known as a design effect
in the survey sampling literature (see, for example, Kish 1965).
The wAi are i.i.d. observations of a random variable WA = wA(S), having population
moments EA[w¯A] = 1 and EA[w2A] = EAW
2
A = nEBWA. So a population version of neff can
be written as
n∗eff =
n(EA[w¯A])
2
EA[w2A]
=
n
EAW 2A
=
n
EBWA
. (17)
If the seed set distributions are known in advance then n∗eff can be computed prior to launching
a field experiment, which can give some indication of the informativeness of the experiment,
say, with respect to different counterfactual policies. This may be useful when the entire
social network is observed and when the seed sets are of small enough size to permit com-
putation of the expectation specified in the expression for n∗eff. Otherwise a Monte Carlo
estimate of n∗eff can easily be constructed by sampling seed sets, or the sample version neff
can be used instead.
4.1.2 Average treatment effect
Now consider an experiment designed to compare strategies A and B, with observations
assigned to both strategies, as in the field experiment conducted by Kim et al. (2015).
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Let nA be the number of observations assigned to A and nB = n − nA be the number of
observations assigned to B. Consider the Hájek estimator τ˜ of the average treatment effect
τ˜ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
wAi
w¯A
− w
B
i
w¯B
)
yi.
As in the off-policy case, if we consider the weights as fixed, then the variance is the sum of
squares of the weights,
Vτ˜ =
σ2
n2
n∑
i=1
(
wAi
w¯A
− w
B
i
w¯B
)2
=
1
n
∑n
i=1(w¯Bw
A
i − w¯AwBi )2
nw¯2Aw¯
2
B
.
In contrast to the off-policy case, there is no standard notion of effective sample size for
this two-sample scenario. The appropriate point of comparison is less clear because we are
estimating a difference between two means. One possibility is to use as a comparison an
ordinary two-sample equal-variance difference-in-means estimator.
In a hypothetical setup where we observe two independent samples of sizes nA and nB =
n− nA, the weights correspond to
wAi =
{
1 if i = 1, . . . , nA
0 if i = nA + 1, . . . , n
wBi = 1− wAi .
Then the Hájek estimator reduces to the difference-in-means estimator and the variance is
VτˆDM =
σ2
n2
n∑
i=1
(
wAi
w¯A
− w
B
i
w¯B
)2
=
σ2
n2
(
nA
w¯2A
+
nB
w¯2B
)
= σ2
(
1
nA
+
1
nB
)
,
the variance of an ordinary two-sample difference-in-means. For example, if our experiment
consists of data from 100 villages where 50 villlages are assigned to random targeting and 50
villages are assigned to nomination targeting, then the difference-in-means (DM) estimator
has variance σ2 × (1/50 + 1/50) = σ2/25.
One reasonable definition of effective sample size, then, is to scale the original sample
size n by the ratio of these two variances,
neff = n︸︷︷︸
original sample size
×
(
1
nA
+
1
nB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
DM scaling
× nw¯
2
Aw¯
2
B
1
n
∑n
i=1(w¯Bw
A
i − w¯AwBi )2︸ ︷︷ ︸
inverse Hájek variance
. (18)
Of course, this is the same as
neff =
1
ρ(1− ρ) ×
nw¯2Aw¯
2
B
1
n
∑n
i=1(w¯Bw
A
i − w¯AwBi )2
,
where ρ is the proportion of units assigned to group A (one-hop targeting). In essence, neff
is defined exactly so that the difference-in-means estimator in a Bernoulli(ρ) experiment has
neff = n (and should thus be viewed conditionally on the proportion parameter ρ).
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As E[w¯A] = E[w¯B] = 1, the denominator on the right-hand side of equation (18) is a
plug-in estimator for E[(WA −WB)2]. Therefore, a population version of neff can be stated
as
n∗eff =
1
ρ(1− ρ) ×
n
E[(WA −WB)2] =
1
ρ(1− ρ) ×
n
E
[(
PA−PB
P∆
)2] . (19)
Notice that the effective sample size depends on the targeting distributions only through
E
[(
PA−PB
P∆
)2]
, capturing the intuition that the n∗eff is lowered if discordant seed sets (those
with very different probabilities between the two targeting strategies) are not accounted for
by the design. Evaluating n∗eff can be a useful indicator for how powerful hypothesis tests
for comparing strategies A and B may be, and can be done before running any experiments
provided the network structures are known.
4.2 Exact inference in finite samples
In order to use the preceding analysis of variance and associated variance estimators for
inference, one can use asymptotic approximations. Measures of effective sample size, or other
diagnostics, may caution against relying exclusively on such approximations. We may instead
wish to conduct exact finite-sample inference without relying on parametric assumptions.
We thus briefly consider Fisherian randomization inference (Fisher 1925, 1935) for τ . In
particular, we consider tests of the hypothesis H0 : τ = 0 and a sharp null hypothesis that
outcomes are not affected by the seed set:
Hsharp0 : yi(s) = yi(s
′) for all s, s′ ∈ Si, i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
We can conduct an exact test of Hsharp0 via Fisherian randomization inference by drawing
counterfactual seed sets according to the design and computing a test statistic with these
counterfactual seed sets and the observed outcomes, as the outcomes are unchanged under
Hsharp0 . While such a test is valid (i.e., results in nominal Type I error rates under H
sharp
0 )
with any choice of test statistic, it is common to use a “Studentized” test statistic based
on the expectation that this will result in tests that are also asymptotically valid under the
non-sharp null H0 (Chung et al. 2013); for the Hájek estimator, this Studentized test statistic
is τ˜ /
√
Vτ˜ .
5 Optimizing the experimental design
A benefit of our approach is that we can use the variance expressions, equations (12) and (14),
as guidance for designing experiments targeted to maximize power for testing the difference
between targeting strategies when the experiment will use a measured network, as in Kim
et al. (2015).
First consider the Horvitz–Thompson estimator. Following from equation (12), a good
choice of P∆ is one that minimizes
σ2∆ := E
[
(PA − PB)2Y 2
P 2∆
]
− τ 2sp = E
[
(pA(S)− pB(S))2y(S)2
p∆(S)2
]
− τ 2sp.
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Then the choice
p∆∗ ∝ |(pA(S)− pB(S))y(S)|
τsp
is optimal. To see this, let p∆ be any other design. Then
σ2∆∗ + τ
2
sp = E∆∗
[
(pA(S)− pB(S))2y(S)2
p∆∗(S)2
]
= τ 2sp
= E∆
[
(pA(S)− pB(S))y(S)
p∆(S)
]2
≤ E∆
[
(pA(S)− pB(S))2y(S)2
p∆(S)2
]
= σ2∆ + τ
2
sp,
using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Of course, p∆∗ is not actually a useful distribution
since it depends on the unknown true treatment effect, but it can provide hints on how
to proceed. In particular, it suggests that seed sets for which the difference in probabilities
|PA−PB| and the magnitude of the response |Y | are both large provide the most information
about the hypothesis, and the distribution of the experimental design should thus place more
weight on these seed sets.
Since the target distributions PA and PB are known, we must proceed by making assump-
tions about the response Y . The simplest such assumption, which we explore in Section 6.2,
is to assume that Y is constant and take P∆ to be proportional to |PA−PB|. This approach
would maximize power in the event that the true data generating process in independent of
the seeding strategies under consideration.
Under this optimized design, the design probability of a seed set will be zero whenever the
probability of the set under one-hop targeting equals the probability under uniform random
targeting. This design does not satisfy the positivity assumption (Assumption 1) as we’ve
stated it in this work, but this optimized design is in fact unproblematic. As noted by Owen
(2013, Section 9.1), it is enough to have P∆ > 0 whenever |PA − PB| > 0.
A more sophisticated approach would model the response using domain knowledge, per-
haps via a social influence model such as the independent cascade model or the linear thresh-
old model (Kempe et al. 2003). The most reliable approach is to use the results of a previous,
pilot experiment to inform the design of the next experiment. Such a bootstrapping proce-
dure is a form of adaptive importance sampling (Owen 2013, Section 10.5). Note that all
of the analysis in this section relies on the fact that Y is non-negative; otherwise, one may
treat the positive and negative parts of Y separately.
Designing an experiment for the Hájek estimator is similar. Examining the variance
expression in equation (14), the optimal design is given by
p∆∗ ∝ |µApA(S)− µBpB(S)− y(S)(pA(S)− pB(S))|.
Again, p∆∗ relies on the unknown quantities Y , µA and µB, which must be estimated in some
way using historical data or domain knowledge.
6 Simulations
In order to study our estimators in a setting where we can observe counterfactual outcomes,
in this section we run simulations of behavior spreading on village networks according to
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a known model. In order to accurately capture the network structure and heterogeneity
exhibited among villages, we use the networks from Cai et al. (2015), the same networks we
study in the empirical analysis of actual insurance decisions in Section 7. See the empirical
analysis for a discussion of our pre-processing steps for that data, which are less relevant to
the present simulations.
We study the accuracy of the variance estimates and resulting coverage rates, the feasi-
bility of off-policy evaluations, and a comparison of a commonly used experimental design
for comparing seeding strategies vs. an optimal design.
6.1 Performance in simple designs
In this simulation, villages are assigned to one-hop or random targeting using Bernoulli(0.5)
coin flips. This is similar to the design in Kim et al. (2015), but without blocking by village
characteristics for simplicity. We fix the seed sets for all interventions to k = 2.
To generate outcomes, we use a model with endogenous social interactions such that
latent utilities are linear-in-means. Our model is a dynamic model similar to that used
in Eckles et al. (2017), which can be regarded as a noisy myopic best response model in
a semi-anonymous game with strategic complements. Let Sij be an indicator for whether
individual j in village i is selected as a seed individual. Let Yij,t ∈ {0, 1} denote the adoption
state of individual j in village i at time t. We set the initial set of adopters to be the seed
sets, Yij,0 = 1{Sij = 1}. Then we define the t-th time step response using the probit model
Y ∗ij,t = α + βZij,t + γXi + εij,t, (20)
Yij,t = max{Yij,t−1,1(Y ∗ij,t > 0)}.
The intercept α captures a baseline threshold for adoption. Let Gijk denote the jk-entry of
the adjacency matrix for the network of village i. Let d−ij =
∑
kGijk and d
+
ij
∑
kGikj be in
the out- and in- degrees of individual j in village i. Define G˜ijk = Gijk/d+ij as that entry in
the row-normalized adjacency matrix if d+ij > 0 and zero otherwise.
Then for time step t, we let
Zij,t =
∑
k
G˜ijkYik,t−1
be the mean of neighboring responses of the previous time step. The parameter β thus
captures the endogenous social effect portion of the utility linear-in-means model. We also
include a term γ for a static, village-level variable
Xi =
∑
j
Sijdij,
the sum of degrees of seed set individuals. Including this feature allows us to further vary the
treatment effect between one-hop and random targeting in our simulations because one-hop
targeting generates high degree seeds more often than random targeting. The term could,
for example, capture social contagion that occurs outside of the observed network.
We use independent εij,t ∼ N(0, 1) noise, which is homoscedastic across time and indi-
viduals. The linear response Y ∗ij,t is then thresholded at zero. We also require that Yij,t = 1
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if Yij,t−1 = 1, which enforces the constraint that adopters cannot revert to a state of non-
adoption. The village-level response Yi is the fraction of adopters after the maximum number
of time steps T have been completed, Yi = n−1i
∑ni
j=1 Yij,T . We set T = 3, noting that the
average pairwise distance for most villages is less than 3.
For parameter values, we vary α ∈ {−3,−2,−1, 0}, β ∈ {0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3}, and
γ ∈ {0, 0.1}. For each of 1,000 Monte Carlo replicates, we consider the following simulation
procedure. We then conduct a simulated experiment by assigning each village to either
one-hop targeting or random targeting via a Bernoulli(0.5) random variable and compute
difference-in-means, Hájek, and Horvitz–Thompson estimators as well as the corresponding
variance estimates described in Section 4. For the difference-in-means estimator we use the
standard Neyman conservative variance estimator
VˆτˆDM =
S21
N1
+
S10
N0
,
where S21 and S20 are the within-group sample variances and N1 and N0 are the group sample
sizes. We also include off-policy Hájek and Horvitz–Thompson estimators that only use the
data from villages assigned to random targeting; these estimators are thus handicapped by
a smaller sample size and by reduced relevance of the sampled seed sets.
6.1.1 Results
Figure 2 (left) displays the true mean adoption rates under random and one-hop targeting.
The parameter values used result in substantial variation in adopted rates and treatment
effects. Figure 2 (right) displays the average estimates along with the true treatment effect.
These estimators are evaluated first according to their total error (Figure 3, left), as all
are approximately unbiased. As expected, the Horvitz–Thompson estimators suffer from
imprecision. On the other hand, the Hájek estimator generally has lower error than the
difference-in-means. Notably, the off-policy Hájek estimator, making use of only half of
the data and without any randomization to the one-hop strategy, sometimes outperforms
the difference-in-means estimator with respect to RMSE. We next evaluate the variance
estimators via the coverage of the resulting confidence intervals (Figure 3, right). The
coverage is generally approximately at the nominal rate. The notable exception is for off-
policy inference in settings with non-zero effects.
Given that the statistical inference is valid, we can ask how much the reduced error
apparent in Figure 3 (left) translates into increased statistical power for the proposed esti-
mators. Across all settings, the Hájek estimator has a true standard error that is 36% to
55% smaller; this corresponds to the gains from collecting data from 143% to 398% more
villages. Figure 4 plots the power of the experiment (the fraction of experiments in which
the null was rejected) as a function of both the simulation parameters (left) and the true
treatment effect (top right). For the response model and parameter distribution used in our
simulations, the Hájek estimator generally has substantially more power than the difference-
in-means estimator, while the Horvitz–Thompson estimator is underpowered due to excessive
variance (Figure 4, bottom right).
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Figure 2: (left) True mean adoption rates for random and one-hop targeting. (right) True
treatment effect and estimated values from the difference-in-means, Horvitz–Thompson, and
Hájek estimators for the simulation setup described in Section 5.1. Each panel represents a
pair (α, γ) of parameters from the model defined by equation (20); columns vary the intercept
α and rows vary the degree effect γ. The horizontal axis varies the spillover effect β.
6.2 Design and effective sample size
We now examine how the effective sample size, defined in Section 4.1, of the Hájek estimator
varies for different designs and network structures. We analyze effective sample size for
four additional collections of networks: the social networks of middle school students in
New Jersey (Paluck et al. 2016), the social networks of students in the AddHealth study
in the United States (Resnick et al. 1997), the social networks of villages from a study of
the diffusion of microfinance in India (Banerjee et al. 2013), and the friendship networks of
villages from a study of community health in Uganda (Chami et al. 2017). For each of these
collections we compute the population effective sample size n∗eff for the Hájek estimator,
equation (19), with seed sets of size k = 2 under three different designs (Bernoulli, optimal
under the null, and only random targeting). Calculating n∗eff requires only knowledge of the
network structure and no actual experimental outcome data.
The results are shown in Table 1. The difference-in-means estimator with a Bernoulli
design would have effective sample size exactly equal to n. The results show that using the
Hájek estimator brings substantial increases in precision. For example, for the Cai et al.
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Figure 3: (left) Root mean-squared-error of estimators. Error increases with β as it produces
more within-village dependence. The off-policy Horvitz–Thompson estimator has high vari-
ance and so is not visible in some panels. (right) Coverage rates for a 90% nominal confidence
interval; shaded area is the 95% acceptance region (p > 0.05) for coverage being at least the
nominal rate. All estimators have approximately nominal coverage, with the exception of
the off-policy estimators, which are working with a much smaller sample size and effective
sample size.
(2015) dataset, using the Hájek estimator is equivalent to having run an experiment on 631
villages rather than the original 150, a fourfold increase. Precision is boosted further by using
the optimal design described in Section 5. Note also that for all but one of the data sets,
the effective sample size for off-policy estimation is greater than that for naïve estimation
with the Bernoulli design; that is, the proposed estimators yield greater precision from an
experiment not designed for the purpose of comparing one-hop and random targeting (τ˜ , off-
policy from random targeting) than a difference-in-means estimator for a field experiment
conducted for that purpose (τˆDM , Bernoulli(0.5)).
The calculations in Table 1 fix the seed set size at k = 2. In Table 2 we study how
the size of the seed sets impacts the effective sample size. We limit this investigation to
k = 1, . . . , 4, because for larger k the population effective sample size n∗eff requires taking
an expectation over many sets and becomes prohibitively expensive to compute. As seed
sets become larger the selection probabilities under one-hop and random targeting diverge,
reducing the benefits of both our Hájek estimator and optimized design. This reduction
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Figure 4: (left) Power of estimators. Estimators with below nominal coverage in a setting are
not shown. (top right) Power for as a function of the true treatment effect. Horizontal axis
is on a logarithmic scale. Off-policy estimators are not shown. (bottom right) Distribution
of differences in power compared with difference-in-means across all settings. Off-policy
estimators are not shown.
in power as k grows suggests that designs involving smaller seed sets are better for testing
hypotheses about differences between one-hop and random targeting; seeding with a small
k is also typically how these problems are posed. That said, these effective sample size
calculations do not take into consideration the possible social influence mechanisms that
may underly an outcome (Aral et al. 2013; Aral and Dhillon 2018).
7 Empirical Applications
The proposed estimators can be applied to existing field experiments. First, they can be used
to increase the precision of estimation in experiments that do directly compare one-hop and
random targeting. Second, they can be used for off-policy estimation of contrasts between
one-hop and random targeting, even when, e.g., only random targeting was conducted, as is
the case in the field experiments we consider here.
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Population effective sample size n∗eff
Dataset n τ˜ , Bernoulli(0.5) τ˜ , optimal τ˜ , off-policy
Cai et al. 150 631.72 871.16 233.36
Paluck et al. 56 351.60 539.04 128.34
AddHealth 85 319.36 448.80 131.04
Banerjee et al. 75 214.32 274.08 80.24
Chami et al. 17 37.84 47.92 9.32
Table 1: The population effective sample size n∗eff, calculated using equations (17) and (19),
for the Hájek estimator τ˜ of the average treatment effect τ (between random and one-hop
targeting) on five datasets, all collections of networks, under different designs all targeting
k = 2 seed nodes. The off-policy evaluation is for estimating one-hop targeting from random
targeting data. These n∗eff can be interpreted as the number of villages needed for a difference-
in-means estimator in a Bernoulli(0.5) experiment to have the same precision. The Hájek
estimator always increases the effective sample size (in expectatation) over difference-in-
means in a Bernoulli design, sometimes drastically. For all networks except Chami et al.
(2017), the Hájek estimator under an off-policy design has greater power than the difference-
in-means estimator when an experiment is explicitly designed for the purpose of comparing
strategies.
7.1 Cai et al. (2015)
We use our method to provide a new analysis of the data studied in Cai et al. (2015).
The authors conducted a field experiment in villages in rural China to study peer effects in
adoption of farmer’s insurance. Villagers were assigned to one of four groups that varied the
timing and intensiveness of the marketing intervention, and the presentation of information
about village-wide uptake in the case of later sessions. We take the seed set to be the set of
villagers assigned to the “intensive” session at the first period.6 The response variable is the
proportion of villagers who chose to purchase the farmer’s insurance product.
There are a small number of edges between residents of different villages; we drop these
edges and consider the villages to be entirely disjoint. Not all villages had households assigned
to treatments that varied within the village, and a few villages had insufficient network
information; we drop all villages containing fewer than 25 edges. After this preprocessing,
we are left with 150 villages, which contrasts with the 185 villages originally analyzed by Cai
et al. (2015). Summary statistics for these 150 villages are given in Table 3.
For each village, we compute the random and one-hop targeting probabilities of the
observed seed set, conditional on the observed seed set size. The random targeting probability
is uniform across all seed sets of the same size, as in equation (1). For the one-hop targeting
probability in equation (5), all of which involve large seed sets, we estimate the probabilities
as discussed extensively in Appendix B. Many (67) observed seed sets are not possible under
6Cai et al. (2015) describes the experiment was stratified on median household size and rice area. Ex-
ploratory analyses seem inconsistent with the most natural interpretation of this description. Thus, for now
and for simplicity, we analyze the experiment as if the design were an unstratified, completely randomized
experiment.
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Population effective sample size n∗eff
k τ˜ , Bernoulli(0.5) τ˜ , optimal τ˜ , off-policy
1 1112.24 1585.48 370.28
2 631.72 871.16 233.36
3 466.68 619.40 149.92
4 383.72 490.76 98.08
Table 2: The population effective sample size n∗eff for the Cai et al. (2015) dataset of 150
villages, for varying seed set sizes k. The values for k = 2 are the same as the values for Cai
et al. (2015) in Table 1. The off-policy evaluation is for estimating one-hop targeting from
random targeting data. The effective sample size decreases with k because the support of
the distribution (number of seed sets) grows in k.
mean st. dev. min max
Edges 93.0 37.4 17.0 188.0
Nodes mi 27.6 9.4 8.0 49.0
Treated % 22.9 7.0 10.0 50.0
Treated count ki 6.2 2.3 1.0 13.0
log10
(
mi
ki
)
12.7 4.9 2.3 26.3
Takeup % 44.9 19.5 5.1 95.8
Table 3: Summary statistics for the 150 villages from Cai et al. (2015) analyzed here.
one-hop targeting because they include nodes with zero in-degree. Aside from these cases
the order of magnitude of the probabilities for both strategies are mostly determined by the
size of the seed set, but there is enough discrepancy between the probabilities to facilitate
off-policy estimation.
We compute the weights of the importance sampling estimators, wAi and wBi . Since the
seed sets were assigned according to random targeting, the random targeting weights are
constant, wBi = bi/bi = 1. The one-hop targeting weights are the ratio of one-hop to random
targeting probabilities, wBi = ai/bi. The probabilities and normalized weights (w˜Ai , w˜Bi ) are
displayed in Figure 5.
Table 4 shows the Hájek estimate and associated inference. Asymptotic inference would
lead to the conclusion that the one-hop strategy would reduce takeup of insurance by 1 to 7
percentage points. Bootstrap inference leads to more conservative but still suggestive con-
clusions. Given the simulation results in Section 6, in which we observed undercoverage in
some settings for off-policy estimation, we should be cautious in relying on this statistical
inference without further analysis. First, the one-hop targeting estimator has an effective
sample size of neff = 28.5 using the off-policy effective sample size expression given in equa-
tion (16). The random targeting estimator of course has neff = n = 150. This suggests
a great deal of caution in using estimated variance to conduct inference (e.g., to construct
confidence intervals) based on normal theory as we have done here. Thus, we also conduct
a hypothesis test using Fisherian randomization inference as discussed in Section 4.2. This
test also provides some evidence against the null of no effects of choice of seeds.
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Figure 5: (left) The ratio of one-hop and random targeting probabilities for the 150 villages
analyzed from the Cai et al. (2015) study. Absolute probabilities are correlated with seed
set size, but there is considerable variation in the ratio. Seed sets with pB = 0 are plotted at
the bottom of the y-axis. (right) Weights as a function of the response and mean insurance
takeup. Since the seed sets in the study were assigned via random targeting, the estimate for
that strategy is an unweighted sample mean, whereas the one-hop targeting estimate applies
reweighting. The vertical dashed lines are the (Hájek) estimated means.
This reanalysis both demonstrates how our proposed estimators can be used off-policy
and provides some cautionary results compared with previous evidence about the one-hop
strategy. In particular, these results suggest that one-hop seeding may in some cases perform
worse than simple random seeding.
estimate (one-hop − rand) -0.0436
SE (analytic) 0.0209
SE (bootstrap) 0.0257
95% CI (analytic) [-0.0846, -0.0027]
95% CI (bootstrap) [-0.0909, 0.0088]
p-value (analytic) 0.0367
p-value (Fisherian) 0.0974
Table 4: Hájek estimate and inference for the difference in insurance takeup rates between
one-hop and random seeding for Cai et al. (2015), which provide some evidence that one-hop
seeding would have reduced adoption of insurance.
7.2 Paluck et al. (2016)
Paluck et al. (2016) conducted a field experiment in 56 middle schools in New Jersey, in which
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mean st. dev. min max
Edges 3157.5 1395.3 1046.0 6561.0
Nodes mi 426.4 172.9 138.0 835.0
Treated % 6.8 2.3 3.8 14.5
Treated count ki 26.0 4.6 20.0 32.0
log10
(
mi
ki
)
94.5 23.1 54.8 133.1
Peer conflict rate (×100) 15.2 13.4 0.0 49.1
Table 5: Summary statistics for the 28 treatment schools from Paluck et al. (2016) analyzed
here.
they randomly assigned an intervention designed to reduce bullying and other peer conflict.
We analyze data from the 28 schools assigned to treatment. A within-school randomization
then assigned some students to be seeds: these students were invited to participate in a
program that encouraged them to take a public stance against conflict among their peers at
school. Paluck et al. (2016) measure several outcome variables of interest; here we focus on
the number of peer conflict events per student as measured by administrative reports, and
defer the results for other outcomes to Appendix C.2. For peer conflict events, lower values
of the outcome are viewed as desirable. Summary statistics for these schools are given in
Table 5.
Like our analysis of Cai et al. (2015), this analysis is also an off-policy evaluation, but
Paluck et al. (2016) treat a smaller fraction of nodes, making it perhaps more typical of
seeding with a limited budget. This intervention was also hypothesized to be more effective
if more central individuals were seeds. In fact, Paluck et al. (2016) find that treatment
reduces peer conflict more when a larger fraction of the seeds that are “social referents,”
defined as being in the top decile of in-degree for that school. Thus, one might expect that
one-hop seeding would be effective in this setting.
Paluck et al. (2016) use a blocked (stratified) randomization to balance selected seed
sets by four blocks formed by grade and gender. We thus consider a variation on one-hop
seeding that conditions on selecting the observed number of seeds kib in each block b of school
i; we could think of this as reflecting a desire to reach a select set of seeds. As with the
previous analysis, Figure 6 (left) shows the ratio of probabilities pA/pB of the observed seed
sets, illustrating that some (five) schools have seed sets that are impossible under one-hop
seeding. Only one observed seed set is more probable under one-hop than random targeting.
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Figure 6: (left) The ratio of one-hop and random targeting probabilities for the 28 treated
schools from the Paluck et al. (2016) study. One school has a seed with higher probability
under one-hop than random seeding. (center) Weights as a function of a primary outcome,
number of administrative peer conflict reports per student. The vertical dashed lines are the
(Hájek) estimated means. (right) Relationship between measure of seed centrality used by
Paluck et al. (2016) and the difference in weights used by our estimator. The school with
very large positive w˜Ai − w˜Bi (17.8) is not shown; 17% of its seeds were social referents.
estimate (one-hop − rand) 0.0997
SE (analytic) 0.0231
SE (bootstrap) 0.0432
95% CI (analytic) [0.0543, 0.1451]
95% CI (bootstrap) [0.0098, 0.1542]
p-value (analytic) 1.7e-05
p-value (Fisherian) 0.0846
Table 6: Hájek estimate and inference for the difference in peer conflict per student one-hop
and random seeding for Paluck et al. (2016), which provide some evidence that one-hop
seeding would have increased peer conflict (i.e., an undesirable outcome).
Table 6 shows the Hájek estimate of the average treatment effect on peer conflict of
one-hop vs. random targeting and associated inference. Asymptotic and bootstrap inference
would lead to the conclusion that the one-hop strategy would increase rates of peer conflict,
as measured by administrative reports, by 0.01 to 0.16 incidents per student. Given the
small number of schools, we conduct Fisherian randomization inference, which also provides
some evidence against the null of no effect of choice of seed set. These results again suggest
that one-hop seeding may in some cases perform worse than simple random seeding.
Appendix C.2 includes results for other secondary outcomes; these results, like those in
Paluck et al. (2016) for the fraction of social referents, do not provide much evidence against
the null, at least when using Fisherian randomization inference.
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8 Discussion
Stochastic seeding strategies are an appealing way of leveraging network structure for mar-
keting, public health, and behavior change interventions when faced with limited network
information and a limited budget. One-hop seeding, like other (mostly deterministic) strate-
gies, is typically motivated by appeal to theory or simulations with an assumed model of
social contagion. The basic theoretical premise of one-hop targeting is that by seeding an
intervention at nodes with higher than average (normalized) in-degrees, more nodes in the
network will have a social connection to the intervention and hopefully adopt themselves. If
one had access to a full social network survey at the onset of the intervention then one could
choose to specifically target the highest in-degree individuals. But besides being conveniently
feasible without a full social network survey, one-step targeting has a specific potential advan-
tage over targeting the maximum in-degree individuals: the maximum in-degree individuals
are often tightly clustered in the network—as is common in networks with core-periphery
structure (Borgatti and Everett 2000; Rombach et al. 2017)—while the high in-degree indi-
viduals selected by one-hop targeting will be relatively spread out due to the initially random
“nominators”. Thus, the neighbors of a seed set selected by one-hop targeting is likely to be
less redundant and perhaps more influential as a whole (cf. Kim et al. 2015).7
In this work we have developed methods for using network data for empirically estimat-
ing the effects of employing strategies such as one-hop seeding, even when the data arise
from, e.g., unconditional random assignment. When an experiment has been conducted that
varies the seeding strategy used, our proposed estimators offer potentially large increases in
statistical precision and power. A much larger follow-up experiment to Kim et al. (2015),
registered in Shakya et al. (2017), employs the same basic design as its predecessor. Given
our simulations here, we expect the preregistered analyses will have lower power than achiev-
able through better design and analysis. Our hope is that this perspective on these seeding
strategies will in turn inform the design and analysis of future studies of seeding as well as
the practice of seeding in marketing, public health, education, and development economics.
We conducted reanalyses of two field experiments using the proposed estimators. In
each case, characteristics of the setting and the original results might suggest that one-hop
seeding would be a promising way to increase the desired outcomes. However, in both cases,
we found some evidence that one-hop seeding would in fact have backfired compared with
random seeding: lowering insurance rates and increasing peer conflict compared to uniform
random targeting. This emphasizes the importance of credible empirical evaluation of these
strategies.
Widely accepted theoretical reasoning motivates why one-hop targeting should lead to a
higher adoption rate than random targeting (for interventions seeking to maximize adoption).
Why, then, do our results suggest that one-hop targeting is no more effective (and possibly
less effective) than random targeting? Here we offer are a number of possible explanations,
none of which are definitive and all of which suggest important follow-up work.
First, it is possible that the social networks collected from the surveys in these studies are
7Avoiding redundancy is key to maximizing influence in the widely studied independent cascade and
linear threshold models (Kempe et al. 2003); if individual decision processes resemble a complex contagion
process (Centola and Macy 2007) then such spreading of seeds would in fact be undesirable.
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not the networks that matter in terms of influence processes guiding the relevant adoption
decisions. The study of name generators (Campbell and Lee 1991; Perkins et al. 2015) in
sociology has long established that different questions lead to different networks, e.g. “Who
are your friends?” vs. “With whom do you discuss important matters?” (Bearman and Parigi
2004). Some name generators have a tendency to elicit strong ties while others elicit weak ties
(Momeni and Rabbat 2017). It is well known that strong and weak ties figure differently in
information diffusion and social decision making (Rapoport and Horvath 1961; Granovetter
1973; McAdam 1986). If trying to maximize adoption, it is natural to then ask what name
generator leads to the greatest adoption under one-hop targeting, and also quite natural
that one-hop targeting paired with some name generators would lead to less adoption than
random seeding. In this vein, Chami et al. (2017) asked both about close friends and about
trusted sources of health advice. Banerjee et al. (2013) collected responses to a total of
twelve different name generators, although most analyses of that study (including our use of
these networks in Section 6.2) analyze only the flattened network of “all relationships.”
Questions about name generators raise an important dimension in which one-hop target-
ing can be refined when it is actually being deployed as a seeding strategy in the absence
of a network survey (meaning the experimenter actually asks subjects to “nominate a ran-
dom friend” as opposed to taking a survey of “all their friends” and randomly selecting a
seed from the friends). As a small change to the protocol, don’t ask subjects to nominate
a random friend but instead ask them to nominate “the farmer they most respect” (for the
weather insurance experiment) or “the student most people look up to” (for the anti-bullying
intervention). This strategy would still count as a stochastic seeding strategy (when the
nominators are a random set of individuals), and many of the ideas in this paper could be
applied to evaluate such strategies. This can be regarded as an explicitly stochastic variation
on name generators used for identifying “opinion leaders” (Flodgren et al. 2011).
Even if the seeds selected by one-hop targeting may be more influential, they may not
be susceptible to the initial intervention. Aral and Walker (2012) present some evidence
of (negative) correlations between susceptibility and influence; this can have substantial
consequences for approximately optimal seeding (Aral and Dhillon 2018). Similarly, Bakshy
et al. (2011) highlight that if more influential individuals require larger inducements to adopt
or promote a behavior, then targeting them may be a poor use of a limited budget.
As a more speculative possible explanation of our findings, it could be that the behavior
in our interventions spread via a “push” mechanism (the seed needs to tell people about
the intervention for it to spread), as opposed to a “pull” mechanism (the friends of the
seed observe them). The sharply different dynamics of diffusion processes under push and
pull mechanisms have been widely studied in the computer science literature (Demers et al.
1987; Chierichetti et al. 2011). A behavior that spread via a push mechanism would benefit
from being seeded at nodes with high out-degree, as opposed to high in-degree for a pull
mechanism. While the in-degree and out-degree of nodes are often correlated, it is generically
possible that a seeding strategy that climbs in average in-degree could decline in average
out-degree. Again, this highlights the importance of the specific name generator and survey
technique used, as in Paluck et al. (2016) out-degree was effectively capped as students were
asked for up to ten students they chose to spend time with; over 40% of students named
exactly ten such students.
As a final variation on concerns about the surveyed network possibly being the “wrong”
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network, it is possible that the actual social network describing influential relationships is
regular (everyone has the same number of influential relations) or nearly regular. In a recent
study of the friendship paradox and contact strength, Bagrow et al. (2017) analyzed contact
frequencies (as a proxy for tie strength) on Twitter and in cellular phone networks and found
that networks of frequent ties are nearly regular, leading to a tempered friendship paradox:
“your closest friends have [only] slightly more friends than you do.” A finding of little or
no difference in adoption rates between random and one-step targeting would be consistent
with the adoption decisions in the two field experiments we analyzed here relying on social
networks that are nearly regular.
It is important to stress that our empirical findings are not inconsistent with established
findings that one-hop targeting can be successfully leveraged to design efficient sensing strate-
gies. In prior work on epidemiological outbreak detection using “one-hop measurement” by
Christakis and Fowler (2010), instances of the flu occurred earlier in a population selected
by a one-hop strategy than a random population. But in the language of this discussion
section, that finding only means that the one-hop strategy was successful in reaching a pop-
ulation that was more (epidemiologically) susceptible, but not necessarily (epidemiologically)
influential.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. To show unbiasedness, it suffices consider a single seed set S ∼ p∆, since the seed
sets are sampled iid. For a single seed set S, the Horvitz–Thompson estimator (10) is
τˆ = (WA −WB)Y = (pA(S)− pB(S))y(S)
p∆(S)
.
This quantity has expectation
E[τˆ ] = E∆
[
pA(S)y(S)
p∆(S)
]
− E∆
[
pB(S)y(S)
p∆(S)
]
= EA[y(S)]− EB[y(S)] = τsp.
The variance of τˆ , for a sample of size n, is calculated as
Var(τˆ) = Var
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
(wAi − wBi )yi
]
=
1
n
E
[
(PA − PB)2Y 2
P 2∆
]
− τ 2sp
=
1
n
E
[
1
P 2∆
((PA − PB)Y − τspP∆)2
]
=
1
n
E[((WA −WB)Y − τsp)2] = Vτˆ/n,
where Vτˆ is defined in equation (12).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Denote the sample averages
w¯A =
1
n
n∑
i=1
wAi
w¯B =
1
n
n∑
i=1
wBi
wyA =
1
n
n∑
i=1
wAi yi
wyB =
1
n
n∑
i=1
wBi yi
so that
τ˜ =
wyA
w¯A
− wyB
w¯B
.
Consistency follows from the consistency of these sample averages and the continuous map-
ping theorem.
The normality result is a straightforward but slightly tedious application of the delta
method, and follows the standard approach for characterizing the limiting behavior of ratio
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estimators (see, for example, Särndal et al. (1992, Section 5.6) or Owen (2013, Ch. 9)).
Let βˆ = (w¯A, w¯B, wyA, wyB)>, and notice that β := E[βˆ] = (1, 1, µA, µB). Furthermore√
n(βˆ − β) ⇒ N(0,Σ), where the entries of the asymptotic variance Σ are defined for
Ω = A,B, by
√
nVar(w¯Ω) = E
[
P 2Ω
P 2∆
]
− 1
√
nVar(wyΩ) = E
[
P 2ΩY
2
P 2∆
]
− µ2Ω
√
nCov(w¯Ω, wyΩ) = E
[
P 2ΩY
P 2∆
]
− µΩ
√
nCov(w¯A, w¯B) = E
[
PAPB
P 2∆
]
− 1
√
nCov(wyA, wyB) = E
[
PAPBY
2
P 2∆
]
− µAµB
√
nCov(w¯A, wyB) = E
[
PAPBY
P 2∆
]
− µB
√
nCov(w¯B, wyA) = E
[
PBPAY
P 2∆
]
− µA
where S ∼ P∆. Now τ˜ = f(βˆ), where f(a, b, c, d) = c/a− d/b and the gradient evaluated at
β is ∇βf = (−µA, µB, 1,−1). Then by the delta method,
Vτ˜ = ∇βf>Σ∇βf =µ2A
(
E
[
P 2A
P 2∆
]
− 1
)
+ µ2B
(
E
[
P 2B
P 2∆
]
− 1
)
+ E
[
P 2AY
2
P 2∆
]
− µ2A + E
[
P 2BY
2
P 2∆
]
− µ2B
− 2µA
(
E
[
P 2AY
P 2∆
]
− µA
)
− 2µB
(
E
[
P 2BY
P 2∆
]
− µB
)
− 2µAµB
(
E
[
PAPB
P 2∆
]
− 1
)
− 2
(
E
[
PAPBY
2
P 2∆
]
− µAµB
)
+ 2µA
(
E
[
PAPBY
P 2∆
]
− µB
)
− 2µB
(
E
[
PBPAY
P 2∆
]
− µA
)
.
=E
[
1
P 2∆
(
µ2AP
2
A + µ
2
BP
2
B + 2µAPAY (PB − PA)− 2µBPBY (PA + PB)
+ P 2AY
2 + P 2BY
2 − 2PAPBY 2 − 2µAµBPAPB
)]
.
Rearranging terms produces the expression in equation (14).
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B Estimating one-hop targeting probabilities
As discussed in Section 2, the seed set probabilities under one-hop targeting strategy with
replacement (of seeds) are given by
PA,repli (Si = s) = k!
∏
v∈s
1
mi
∑
u∈Nin(v)
1
doutu
, (21)
where PA,repli denotes probability with respect to pAi with replacement, Nin(v) denotes the
set of in-neighbors of v, and doutu denotes the out-degree of node u. For a given seed set s
this probability is straight-forward to compute.
To translate probabilities with replacement to probabilities without, we compute the
total probability
pii =
∑
s∈Si:s unique,|s|=k
PA,repli (Si = s), (22)
which lets us use a simple normalization to compute the one-hop targeting probabilities
without replacement:
PAi (Si = s) =
1
pii
PA,repli (Si = s). (23)
In this appendix we discuss an estimator pˆii for pii, which is suitable when |Si| =
(
mi
k
)
,
the number of seed sets of size k (the number of terms in the sum (22) to compute pii), is
large.
For notational convenience, in the following presentation we will suppress village sub-
scripts (mi = m, Si = S, pii = pi, etc.). Let N =
(
m
k
)
and let
pj = P
A,repl(S = sj) = k!
∏
v∈sj
1
m
∑
u∈Nin(v)
1
doutu
be the probability, with replacement, for each of the j = 1, .., N seed sets of size k with
unique elements. Note that pi =
∑N
j=1 pj.
B.1 The estimator pˆi
Our general approach will be to estimate pi using a modest sample of R probabilities—
probabilities with replacement—for seed sets that we can sample uniformly from sets of
unique elements (sets without replacement). Individual probabilities with replacement are
not hard to compute, we can compute them exactly using (22). The difficult in computing
pi is that there are so many sets. Producing a uniform sample can be done easily in O(km)
time, and each sample’s probability under one-hop targeting can be computed in O(km)
time, so this computation that follows is a modest O(kmR).
Let X1, ..., XR be the i.i.d. random variables representing that probability computed for
each sample. Then P(X` = pj) = 1/N , for each X`, each j.
Now consider the estimator
pˆi =
N
R
R∑
i=1
Xi. (24)
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It is clear that E[pˆi] = N
R
R 1
N
∑N
j=1 pj = pi.
Since the estimator pi relies in R samples from the uniform distribution over sets of size k
with unique elements, a natural question is if we can improve the efficiency of the estimator,
specifically by using stratified sampling of the seed sets. We briefly give a simple stratification
technique (that also has computational advantages) that we successfully employ in this work.
At the same time we note that in the later analysis of the variance of pˆi in this appendix, we
assume all seed sets are sampled i.i.d.
Rather than sample R sets each of size k, a simple way to sample sets is to take a uniform
shuffle of the node order and split the set sequentially into sets of size k, producing r=dm/ke
sets from a single shuffle. These r sets all constitute unbiased, albeit dependent, samples
from the uniform distribution. Their dependence is a useful one, effectively serving as a
stratified sample, requiring each node to appear at least once in each set of samples. In
practice we find that this stratification reduces the variance of our estimates.
We have not thoroughly explored the possibilities for stratified sampling strategies for
the estimator pˆi, nor have we considered other possible ways to estimate pi that may be more
efficient. The estimators (basic and stratified) discussed here are adequate for the scale of
data we handle in this work.
B.2 Variance estimation and bound
The variance of pˆi is given by:
Var[pˆi] =
N2
R2
R∑
i=1
Var[Xi] (25)
=
N2
R
1
N
N∑
j=1
(pj − p¯)2, (26)
where p¯ = 1
N
∑N
j=1 pj. Notice Np¯ = pi, so if we knew p¯ then we wouldn’t need pˆi.
Notice that if the probabilities pj are uniformly 1/N , as they are for any in- and out-
regular graph, then the variance of pˆi is zero. More interestingly, we can bound this variance
in non-vacuous ways, without estimating it, using efficiently computable properties of the
graph.
Variance estimate. Let S2p be the unbiased sample variance of X1, . . . , XR, the R
probabilities corresponding to uniform samples,
S2p =
1
R− 1
R∑
i=1
(Xi − X¯)2. (27)
This sample variance is an unbiased estimate of the variance of each of the i.i.d. Xi’s. As
such, we can estimate the variance of pˆi as:
Vˆpˆi = V̂ar[pˆi] =
N2
R
S2p . (28)
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Variance bound. We will give two upper bounds: one bound that depends on
efficiently computable properties of the graph and one that depends merely on the maximum
and minimum in- and out-degrees.
We begin by noting that 1
N
∑N
j=1(pj − p¯)2 in (26) is the variance of a discrete random
variable that has compact support on [0, 1], and we can tighten this support further by
deriving maximum and minimum probabilities pmax and pmin. For a discrete random variable
with compact support on [pmin, pmax], we can bound (26) by:
Var[pˆi] =
N2
R
1
N
N∑
j=1
(pj − p¯)2 (29)
≤ N
2
R
1
2
[(
pmax − pmax + pmin
2
)2
+
(
pmin − pmax + pmin
2
)2]
(30)
=
N2
4R
(pmax − pmin)2. (31)
Recall the probability (with replacement) of each seed set s:
pj =
k!
mk
∏
v∈s
∑
u∈Nin(v)
1
doutu︸ ︷︷ ︸
cv
, (32)
where we’ve isolated the terms cv as those that depend on the nodes v in the set. We can
compute {cv}v∈V from the graph for all nodes in O(n) time. Let c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn−1 ≤ cn
be the individual terms in sorted order. Given these quantities in sorted order, we then
know that pmin and pmax are simply the products of the smallest and largest k elements,
respectively:
pmin = min
sj∈S,sj unique
PA,repl(S = sj) =
k!
mk
k∏
i=1
ci, (33)
pmax = max
sj∈S,sj unique
PA,repl(S = sj) =
k!
mk
n∏
i=n−k+1
ci. (34)
Returning to (31), we have the computable bound:
Var[pˆi] ≤ N
2
4R
(
k!
mk
n∏
i=n−k+1
ci − k!
mk
k∏
i=1
ci
)2
(35)
=
1
4R
(
k!
(
m
k
)
mk
)2( n∏
i=n−k+1
ci −
k∏
i=1
ci
)2
. (36)
In the last step we’ve re-introduced N =
(
m
k
)
to highlight the fact that the ratio k!
(
m
k
)
/mk ≤
1, for all m, k. For the largest village in the Cai et al. (2015) dataset m = 49 and k = 13, so
(k!
(
m
k
)
/mk)2 ≈ 0.1742 ≈ 0.0303. The quantity (36) is efficiently computable for any graph.
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We can also furnish a simpler (but almost always looser) bound using the maximum
and minimum in-/out-degree of the graph. Let din-max = maxv∈V dinv , din-min = minv∈V dinv ,
dout-max = maxv∈V doutv , and dout-min = minv∈V doutv . Then
n∏
i=n−k+1
ci ≤
(
din-max
dout-min
)k
,
k∏
i=1
ci ≥
(
din-min
dout-max
)k
. (37)
The bound (36) then reduces to
Var[pˆi] ≤ 1
4R
(
k!
(
m
k
)
mk
)2 [(
din-max
dout-min
)k
−
(
din-min
dout-max
)k]2
. (38)
For a graph that is in- and out-regular (all in- and out- degrees equal), this upper bound
is zero, indicating that this bound is not always loose. While (38) is extremely simple to
compute, we derive it mostly to guide intuition. It can be much looser than (36) in practice,
as is discussed below. The bound (36) is entirely straight-forward and always preferred.
Thus, given a desired precision for our estimate of pi, the bound (36) can be used to select
a sufficiently large R.
B.3 Estimator evaluation
We briefly evaluate the above estimator of the one-hop targeting probabilities in isolation
from the many moving parts of our broader analysis of treatment effects. In Figure B.1
we analyze the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the estimator across the 150 villages in
the Cai et al. (2015) dataset, varying the number of samples R and size of seed sets k.
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Figure B.1: (left) The RMSE of pˆi as a function of the number of samples R for each of the
150 villages in the Cai et al. (2015) dataset. (center) A convergence plot for Village 1 of
that dataset, showing the estimate pˆi explicitly as a function of R alongside estimates and
bounds of the standard deviation. (right) The RMSE as a function of k, the size of the seed
sets. The actual RMSE increases much slower than the graph- and degree-based bounds.
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C Supplementary empirical analyses
C.1 Kim et al. (2015)
The following figure is based on data presented in Table S3 of Kim et al. (2015).
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Figure C.1: Mean indegree of the seed sets selected in Kim et al. (2015) for those villages
assigned to one-hop targeting for one product (multivitamins or chlorine) and random tar-
geting for the other.
C.2 Paluck et al. (2015)
Here we report some additional details from the reanalysis of Paluck et al. (2016).
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
−5 0 5 10 15
t−statistic
de
ns
ity
Figure C.2: Fisherian randomization inference for peer conflict per student using the dis-
tribution of Studentized Hàjek estimator (i.e., t-statistic) under a sharp null. This figure
elaborates on Table 6. Observed statistic shown by red line.
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Here we provide results for two additional outcomes: the self-reported rate of wearing an
anticonflict wristband and the self-reported number of friends talking about peer conflict.
An increase in both of these outcomes is viewed as a desirable result.
estimate (one-hop − rand) 0.0544
SE (analytic) 0.0141
SE (bootstrap) 0.0260
95% CI (analytic) [0.0269, 0.0820]
95% CI (bootstrap) [-0.0075, 0.0886]
p-value (analytic) 0.00011
p-value (Fisherian) 0.1376
Table C.1: Hájek estimate and inference for the difference in self-reported wristband-wearing
one-hop and random targeting for Paluck et al. (2016).
estimate (one-hop − rand) 0.0600
SE (analytic) 0.0190
SE (bootstrap) 0.0256
95% CI (analytic) [0.0228, 0.0973]
95% CI (bootstrap) [0.0111, 0.1153]
p-value (analytic) 0.0016
p-value (Fisherian) 0.2706
Table C.2: Hájek estimate and inference for the difference in self-reported friends talking
about peer conflict one-hop and random targeting for Paluck et al. (2016).
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AB
Figure C.3: Social networks for two schools in Paluck et al. (2016) showing social referents
(squares) and students eligible to be selected (black) and students selected as seeds (red).
Each node v is sized proportional to PA,repli (Si = v) (i.e., row-normalized in-degree), not
accounting for being eligible for treatment. Both have a somewhat similar fraction of the
seed set who are social referents, with A a bit larger than B (A: 0.208, B: 0.167). But this
is notably reversed for wA (A: 1.1e-4, B: 0.00395).
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